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Hudson v. Michigan: “Knock-and-Announce”—An 
Outdated Rule? 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The scene is a familiar one—gathering members of S.W.A.T. place 
themselves around a home where a dangerous and villainous individual 
hides. While inside waiting, the criminal loads his weapons, makes 
threats to members of law enforcement, and in many situations, holds 
hostages. What happens once law enforcement officers strategically 
place themselves in the surrounding area is often tragic. Someone fires a 
shot, the criminal fails to drop his weapon, a hostage is killed, or a host 
of other events occur, leading to officers charging into the home to stop 
the individual. 
Citizens view this scenario almost nightly on prime time television 
and weekly on the big screen, and occasionally as the topic of breaking 
local news. The end result in these situations is often swift and decisive. 
The point of this scenario is to get the law enforcement officers into the 
criminal’s premises to take control of the situation and apprehend the 
criminal. In situations where S.W.A.T is involved, it is more evident that 
the governmental intrusion is necessary and critical. However, in less 
severe situations, the need for governmental intrusion into the home is 
less clear-cut; for example, entering unannounced into an individual’s 
home in an attempt to discover incriminating evidence or to apprehend a 
criminal. If law enforcement officials are not careful, these intrusions 
into private homes, while inspiring a very heroic image of law 
enforcement officers in the media, can neglect basic and fundamental 
constitutional rights individuals enjoy against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. This is exactly what happened in Hudson v. Michigan1 where 
law enforcement officers made an unlawful entry into Booker T. 
Hudson’s home to search for narcotics and guns. 
This Note examines the “knock-and-announce” requirement, which 
requires law enforcement officers to both knock and announce their entry 
before entering an individual’s home. This examination takes place in 
light of Hudson v. Michigan holding that evidence obtained in violation 
of the “knock-and-announce” requirement is nonetheless admissible. 
Additionally, this Note will examine the potential negative ramifications 
 1. 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006). 
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of the Court’s holding, including its sterilization of the “knock-and-
announce” rule for excluding evidence. This Note concludes that where 
Hudson strips the “knock-and-announce” of its Fourth Amendment bite, 
it stands for more than not requiring evidence suppression, but also 
sidesteps the applicability and future of the “knock-and-announce” 
requirement. 
Accordingly, section II of this Note deals with background of the 
“knock-and-announce” rule, the reasons for the rule, and its application 
to Fourth Amendment violations including for the suppression of 
evidence. Section III examines the particular facts of Hudson v. 
Michigan, including the methods the court uses in its analysis of the 
issues. Section IV states the Court’s reasoning in Hudson including 
policy arguments and reasons for the majority’s position. Section V 
analyzes the Court’s holding and ultimate determination, identifying 
weaknesses with the majority’s position and suggesting areas of 
appropriate change. Finally, section VI concludes with a summary and 
discussion of the benefits in adopting the approach articulated by the 
dissent in Hudson. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
The Fourth Amendment protects person and property from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.2 The Supreme Court has declared 
that the “knock-and-announce” requirement forms part of the inquiry in 
determining whether a search or seizure is reasonable.3 One reason for 
requiring this standard is to protect the safety and security of individuals 
from intrusion in their places of residence and other safe havens.4
However, the debate has raged on the appropriateness of such a 
standard because law enforcement objectives are disadvantaged when 
agents are required to “knock-and-announce” before entering. 
Advantages of the “knock-and-announce” requirement are that it helps 
people avoid compromising situations that can arise upon unannounced 
entry, and it gives individuals the time necessary to gather themselves for 
visitors.5 A disadvantage of the requirement is that it leads to inefficiency 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
  The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Id. 
 3. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2172 (quoting Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995)). 
 4. Id. at 2180. 
 5. Id. at 2165. 
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because individuals are given time following a warning to hide 
incriminating evidence from law enforcement officers.6 This can lead 
both figuratively7 and literally to evidence being flushed down the toilet.8 
Additionally, such opponents argue that by knocking and announcing, 
law enforcement officers face dangerous situations by allowing criminals 
the time to marshal firearms or other weapons.9
The Supreme Court has primarily dealt with these risks by granting 
law enforcement a broad window of interpretation in the “knock-and-
announce” rule. As part of this broad window, the Supreme Court, while 
giving credence to the “knock-and-announce” standard, indicated 
awareness of the very real threat of criminals turning on law enforcement 
after law enforcement officers have knocked and announced by stating 
that “a mere ‘reasonable suspicion’ that knocking and announcing ‘under 
[certain] circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would 
inhibit the effective investigation of the crime,’ will cause the 
requirement to yield.”10 Thus, in situations where there exists a 
“reasonable suspicion” of danger or futility from knocking and 
announcing, law enforcement officers can ignore the requirement and 
enter.11
In addition to the myriad of cases involving “knock-and-announce” 
violations, the legislative branch has foreseen and accounted for 
circumstances where a “reasonable suspicion” may arise.12 The main 
legislative solution is the issuance of the “no knock” warrant, which 
allows for immediate entry.13 This demonstrates that both the judicial and 
legislative branches have tried to accommodate law enforcement by 
granting wider leeway to the strict obedience of the “knock-and-
announce” requirement. 
However, for those situations where the “knock and announce” rule 
is applied, one controversy remains: the extent to which, if a Fourth 
Amendment violation occurs, the exclusionary rule suppresses any 
evidence or information found during the search and seizure from being 
used in court. 
 
 
 6. Id. at 2166. 
 7. Id. 
 8. United States v. Navedo, 443 F. Supp. 2d 431, 437 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 9. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2162-63. 
 10. Id. at 2166 (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997)). 
 11. Id. at 2163. 
 12. Id. at 2182. 
 13. Id. 
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III.  FACTS OF HUDSON V. MICHIGAN14
 
The Hudson decision gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to 
further comment on the “knock–and-announce” requirement and its 
ability to trigger the application of the exclusionary rule that suppresses 
evidence obtained in an unlawful search and seizure. 
The decision in Hudson arose after almost a decade of silence from 
the Supreme Court on Fourth Amendment search and seizure inquiries. 
In U.S. v. Ramirez, the most recent Supreme Court articulation of the 
Fourth Amendment search and seizure inquiry, the Court stated that if 
the manner of entry was unreasonable, implying illegality, then “it would 
have been necessary to determine whether there had been a ‘sufficient 
causal relationship between the [unlawful entry] and the discovery of the 
guns to warrant suppression of the evidence.’”15 Since Ramirez, circuits 
have been in disagreement on what the “sufficient causal relationship” 
would be in relation to inevitable discovery.16 If there was a sufficient 
causal relationship between the manner of entry and the inevitable 
discovery, then courts generally excluded the evidence from use against 
the individual. It was under this framework that Hudson occurred. 
On the afternoon of August 27, 1998, approximately seven Detroit 
police officers arrived at Booker T. Hudson’s home to execute a search 
warrant for narcotics. There was no indication that anyone in the home 
would destroy or attempt to destroy evidence, escape, or resist the 
execution of the warrant.17 The import of this being that there was an 
absence of the reasonable suspicion necessary to supersede the “knock-
and-announce” requirement. Upon arriving at the home, some of the 
officers shouted, “Police, search warrant.”18 However, the officers did 
not knock,19 and they waited only three to five seconds20 before opening 
the door and entering. One officer characterized the wait as the amount 
of time it took to open the door and describing the entry as “real fast.”21 
Once law enforcement officers entered the home, they immediately 
found Hudson seated in a chair where they ordered him to stay still.22 
 14. This Part is derived primarily from the direct examination of police officer Jamal Good. 
Joint Appendix, Hudson, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 04-1360), 2005 WL 2083644, at *17–20 [hereinafter 
Joint Appendix]. 
 15. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2170 (quoting United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 72 (1998)). 
 16. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 17. Joint Appendix, supra note 14, at *15. 
 18. Id. at *19. 
 19. Id. at *8. 
 20. Id. at *15. 
 21. Id. at *19. 
 22. Id. at *6. 
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While searching the home, the officers found five rocks of crack cocaine 
in Hudson’s pants pocket. Hudson moved to suppress the evidence found 
in his home on the ground that the police had violated the Fourth 
Amendment and Michigan law by failing to knock-and-announce before 
entering his home.23
The Michigan trial court granted a motion for suppressing the 
evidence based on a Fourth Amendment violation.24 However, “on 
interlocutory review, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed.”25 The 
Michigan Supreme Court “denied leave to appeal,” and Hudson was 
subsequently convicted of possession of drugs.26 After a renewed claim, 
rejection by the Court of Appeals, and the Michigan Supreme Court 
declining review, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.27 In its majority 
opinion, the Supreme Court held that “a violation of [the “knock-and-
announce” rule] is not sufficiently related to the later discovery of 
evidence to justify suppression.”28
 
IV.  REASONING 
 
The Court began its reasoning by recognizing that the principle of 
announcing one’s presence and providing residents with the opportunity 
to open the door is ancient, with origins linked to our English legal 
heritage.29 Additionally, the Court recognized that this rule “was also a 
command of the Fourth Amendment.”30 However, the Court made a 
point of mentioning that this standard has exceptions. 
For example, exception may be found “[if] ‘circumstances presen[t] 
a threat of physical violence,’ or if there is ‘reason to believe that 
evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice [of entry] were 
given,’ or if knocking and announcing would be ‘futile.’”31 In these 
situations the Court only requires that police “have a reasonable 
suspicion . . . under the particular circumstances” that one of these 
exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule exists.32 The Court, however, 
 23. Id. at *9. 
 24. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (2006). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 2170. 
 30. Id. at 2162. 
 31. Id. at 2162–63 (quoting Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995)) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 32. Id. at 2163 (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997)) (internal quotes 
omitted). 
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expressed that these issues were irrelevant to this inquiry because 
Michigan conceded a “knock-and-announce” violation.33
 
A.  Whether Suppression Is the Necessary Remedy 
 
The Court, however, stated that the main issue of the case was 
whether the exclusionary rule is appropriate for “knock-and-announce” 
violations; thus the majority set out to make this determination.34 The 
Court stated that “[s]uppression of evidence . . . has always been [the 
court’s] last resort, not [the court’s] first impulse” because “[t]he 
exclusionary rule generates ‘substantial social costs’” including the 
occasional situation of “setting the guilty free and the dangerous at 
large.”35
 
B.  But-For Causation 
 
The Court found that the illegal entry in this case was not the but-for 
cause of obtaining evidence, and further found that even if it was, that 
but-for causation is not enough to justify exclusion.36 The Court reasoned 
that “exclusion may not be premised on the mere fact that a 
constitutional violation was a ‘but-for’ cause of obtaining evidence,” 
noting “that but-for causality is only a necessary, not a sufficient, 
condition for suppression of evidence.”37 The court stated that in this 
case the constitutional violation in the illegal manner of entry was not a 
but-for cause of obtaining the evidence because whether the misstep of 
ignoring the “knock-and-announce” rule had occurred or not, “the police 
would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and would have 
discovered the gun and drugs inside the house.”38 The Court further 
reasoned that “even if the illegal entry [is] characterized as a but-for 
cause of discovering [the evidence], . . . [the] evidence is [not] ‘fruit of 
the poisonous tree.’”39 Rather the Court asks “whether, granting 
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant 
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or 
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint.”40 Additionally, the Court sets forth an argument that under but-for 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)). 
 36. Id. at 2164. 
 37. Id. at 2164. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984)). 
 40. Id. (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963)) (internal quotes 
  
433] KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE – AN OUTDATED RULE? 439 
 
causation, attenuation is generally too remote.41
 
C.  Interests Protected by “Knock-and-Announce” Requirement 
 
Furthermore, the Court identifies the interests protected under the 
“knock-and-announce” rule as the protection of human life and limb, 
property, and “those elements of privacy and dignity that can be 
destroyed by a sudden entrance.”42 As the Court states, however, the 
“knock-and-announce” rule has never protected an individual from the 
government’s interest in seeing or taking evidence pursuant to a valid 
warrant.43 The Court applies this reasoning to mean that a violation of the 
“knock-and-announce” rule should not result in suppression of evidence. 
Allowing for the suppression of evidence in situations where there is a 
“knock-and-announce violation” is the equivalent of winning the lottery, 
where the cost is small but the jackpot is enormous.44 For such a small 
violation to result in the suppression of evidence would, in some cases, 
be like issuing “get-out-of-jail-free card[s].”45
 
D.  Reasonable Wait Time Under “Knock-and-Announce” Requirement 
 
Additionally, for a violation under the knock-and-announce rule, the 
Court reasons that a “reasonable wait time” in a particular case is 
difficult for the trial court or appellate court to determine.46 The Court 
extends this reasoning to the facts in Hudson’s situation of officers 
yelling and then simply waiting as long as it takes to open the door. 
Defining a “reasonable wait time” can be a matter of splitting hairs, 
especially when determined on a case-by-case basis, and can have the 
consequence of sending “incongruent” messages to law enforcement on 
the appropriate wait time required under the Fourth Amendment. As 
such, this could lead to the severe consequence where “officers [are] 
inclined to wait longer than the law requires[, thereby] producing 
preventable violence against officers” and in some cases destruction of 
evidence.47
 
 
omitted). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 2165. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 2166. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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E.  Deterrence Benefits 
 
 The Court reasoned that it should not use extreme measures like 
evidence suppression to ensure compliance with the “knock-and-
announce” requirement because “the value of deterrence depends upon 
the strength of the incentive to commit the forbidden act.”48 The Court 
applied this language to the case of Hudson and determined that the 
value of deterring violations is low because of the potential dangers to 
law enforcement officers from following the “knock-and-announce” 
requirement. In fact, violating the “knock and announce” requirement 
often leads to the discovery of more incriminating evidence than would 
otherwise be available.49 From the standpoint of the Court, “ignoring 
knock-and-announce can realistically be expected to achieve absolutely 
nothing except the prevention of destruction of evidence and the 
avoidance of life-threatening resistance by occupants of the 
premises . . . .”50 Because of such dangers, the Court dismisses the 
“knock-and-announce” requirement where such circumstances give law 
enforcement “reasonable suspicion.”51
 
F.  Better Training Means Increased Awareness 
 
The Court cites as another reason for not suppressing evidence “the 
increasing professionalism of police forces, including . . . [the] emphasis 
on internal police discipline [prevalent in police forces].”52 According to 
the Court, these new disciplinary procedures by law enforcement indicate 
the increasing awareness and ability of law enforcement officers to “take 
the constitutional rights of citizens seriously.”53
In the end, the Court concluded that “the social costs of applying the 
exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations are considerable,” 
and where the “incentive[s] to such violations [are] minimal to begin 
with, and the extant deterrences against [violations] are substantial, . . . 
[then] resort[ing] to the massive remedy of suppressing evidence of guilt 
is unjustified.”54
 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 2168. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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G.  Why Evidence Inclusion Is Appropriate: Supporting Case Law 
 
In making its next argument, the Court turned to and relied on three 
separate cases: Segura v. United States,55 New York v. Harris,56 and 
United States v. Ramirez.57 The Court used these cases to illustrate why 
evidence inclusion is appropriate though a “knock-and-announce” 
violation has occurred. 
 
1.  Segura v. United States 
 
Like Hudson, Segura also involved an illegal entry. In Segura, the 
police waited for Segura outside an apartment building and upon his 
arrival, Segura denied living there.58 The police then brought Segura up 
to the apartment, an officer knocked, and when someone answered the 
door, the police entered.59 In this case the officers had “neither a warrant 
nor consent to enter, and they [failed to] announce themselves as police,” 
a situation that the Court describes as “illegal as can be.”60 The police, 
while still inside, were informed that a warrant had been obtained, and 
the Court refused to exclude the resulting evidence.61 The court 
recognized that “only the evidence gained from the particular violation 
could be excluded” and therefore carved a distinction stating, “[n]one of 
the information on which the warrant was secured was derived from or 
related in any way to the initial entry into petitioners’ apartment.”62The 
Court drew the conclusion that treating Hudson differently would be 
“bizarre,” especially where the officers gained entry in Segura without 
the use of a warrant, and the officers in Hudson had a warrant prepared 
for execution.63
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55. 468 U.S. 796 (1984). 
 56. 495 U.S. 14 (1990). 
 57. 523 U.S. 65 (1998). 
 58. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2168. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 2169. 
 62. Id. (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 814 (1984)) (internal quotes omitted). 
 63. Id. 
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2.  New York v. Harris 
 
In Harris, a Fourth Amendment violation occurred when the police 
arrested the defendant in his home without a warrant.64 The court refused 
to exclude an incriminating statement the defendant gave once he was at 
the police station.65 The Supreme Court in Hudson makes the comparison 
that “[l]ike the illegal entry [for Hudson], the illegal entry in Harris 
began a process that culminated in acquisition of the evidence sought to 
be excluded,” and that while the statement provided was “the product of 
an arrest and being in custody,” it is distinguished by not being the fruit 
of the arrest being made at the house rather than someplace else.66 The 
Court concludes the comparison by stating that “[w]hile acquisition of 
the gun and drugs was the product of a search pursuant to warrant,” 
albeit illegal because of the knock-and-announce violation, “it was not 
the fruit of the fact that the entry was not preceded by [following the] 
knock and announce [rule].”67
 
3.  United States v. Ramirez 
 
As its final example supporting the inclusion of the evidence 
obtained by the illegal entry,68 the Court cites to United States v. 
Ramirez.69 In Ramirez, the Court found that police violated the Fourth 
Amendment by breaking a window to enter the premises.70 The Court 
ultimately concluded that “the property destruction was . . . reasonable,” 
but said that “destruction of property in the course of a search may 
violate the Fourth Amendment, even [if] the entry itself is lawful and the 
fruits of the search are not subject to suppression.”71 What was important 
to the Court was determining whether the breaking of the window and 
discovery of evidence had a “sufficient causal relationship.”72 The Court 
applied the Ramirez reasoning when it determined that the few seconds 
gained by not knocking and announcing, when compared with the 
evidence later discovered, did not create such a sufficient causal 
 64. Id.. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. (quoting New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 20 (1990)) (emphasis added) (internal 
quotes omitted). 
 67. Id. (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. at 2170. 
 69. 523 U.S. 65 (1998). 
 70. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2170. 
 71. Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 71. 
 72. Id. at 72 n.3. 
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relationship to warrant excluding the evidence.73
 
H.  The Hudson Holding and Its Implications 
 
Based on the majority’s reasoning, the decision in Hudson 
“determines only that in the specific context of the “knock-and-
announce” requirement, a violation is not sufficiently related to the later 
discovery of evidence to justify suppression.”74 Tangential questions 
follow on what the practical effect of the “knock-and-announce” rule is if 
one can skirt the rule, but courts still hold any evidence obtained 
admissible. The majority argues that in addition to protecting “human 
life and limb,” the rule functions to prevent embarrassing defendants by 
stopping law enforcement officers from entering and finding defendants 
during compromising situations.75 Additionally, the Court argues that the 
purpose of the requirement partially rests with providing protection for 
law enforcement from dangerous and compromising situations where the 
startled defendant may resort to violence by the surprise of the 
intrusion.76
 
V.  ANALYSIS 
 
Rather than adopt the approach articulated by the majority for future 
“knock-and-announce” jurisprudence, the dissent articulated the more 
appropriate standard, and properly deals with “knock-and-announce” 
violations. Led by Justice Breyer, Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg 
argue that evidence exclusion is the appropriate remedy in “knock-and-
announce” violations. The dissent discusses the context of the Fourth 
Amendment “knock-and-announce requirement, including important 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue, and the protections  afforded 
by evidence exclusion under the “knock-and-announce” requirement. 
According to the dissent, the majority’s use of the reasonable suspicion 
requirement leads to a slippery slope resulting in the sterilization of the 
“knock-and-announce” requirement. The dissent also looks at the 
existing legislative and judicial protections law enforcement has been 
granted. 
 
 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 75. Id. at 2165. 
 76. Id. 
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A.  Previous Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
 
1.  Wilson v. Arkansas: What does it stand for? 
 
Prior to the decision in Hudson, one of the most recent Supreme 
Court decisions dealing with Fourth Amendment questions was Wilson v. 
Arkansas.77 The result of Wilson was a victory for defendants’ rights,78 as 
it held that the common law “knock-and-announce” principle formed a 
part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry.79 One author 
described the result of Wilson as a decision that “should have an 
immediate practical impact [on defendants’ rights] by forcing police 
departments and law enforcement agencies at all levels to re-examine 
their ‘no-knock’ and ‘dynamic entry’ search and seizure policies.”80
One of the unresolved issues of the Wilson decision was whether it 
would uphold the Weeks exclusionary rule doctrine.81 The Court in 
Hudson pointed out that “Wilson specifically declined to decide whether 
the exclusionary rule is appropriate for violation of the knock-and-
announce requirement.”82 However, one commentator posited that the 
result of Wilson would “render the exclusionary rule ineffective.”83 The 
result of Wilson was not an evaporation of the exclusionary rule, but a 
declaration that the “knock-and-announce” requirement formed party of 
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry.84 Thus, while Wilson 
remained silent surrounding the application of the exclusionary rule, 
years of precedent held that evidence obtained through a “knock-and-
announce” violation was inadmissible.85 In Weeks v. United States,86 the 
Supreme Court initially held “that evidence obtained in violation of an 
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights cannot be used against that 
individual in a criminal prosecution.”87 The initial exclusionary rule was 
 77. 514 U.S. 927 (1995). 
 78. Brent P. Reilly, Comment, Wilson v. Arkansas and the Knock and Announce Rule: 
Giving Content to the Fourth Amendment, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 663, 666 (1997). 
 79. The Fourth Amendment protects people’s rights “to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. As a result 
of Wilson, the knock-and-announce rule helps determine what is reasonable, as is described in the 
language “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 80. Reilly, supra note 78, at 666 (quoting Marcia Coyle, The Justices Close Ranks on ‘Knock 
and Announce,’ NAT’L L.J., at A14 (June 5, 1995)) (internal quotes omitted). 
 81. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Reilly, supra note 78, at 697. 
 84. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163. 
 85. See Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 643 (1961). 
 86. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 87. Reilly, supra note 78, at 670. 
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limited in its reach as it applied only to “federal government and its 
agencies”⎯meaning that evidence suppression was unnecessary and 
inappropriate for government officials acting in an individual capacity.88 
Not only was this a limit to its reach, but state courts also were not 
required to follow the exclusionary rule.89
The Supreme Court, however, “broadened the applicability of the 
exclusionary rule”90 in Mapp v. Ohio,91 where it held that “all evidence 
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is . . . 
inadmissible in a state court.”92 The Mapp holding “eliminated the 
distinction in Weeks.”93
Therefore, while the Supreme Court evidence exclusion 
jurisprudence was initially limited, its role was eventually expanded. Not 
only did the Supreme Court give the exclusionary rule more expansive 
power, but it solidified the importance of deterring law enforcement 
officers from making unreasonable searches or seizures by excluding 
evidence obtained on a “knock-and-announce” violation. 
However, with the decision in Hudson, the court drastically sterilized 
the power of evidence exclusion. The Court’s determination that the 
purpose of “knock-and-announce” is its ability for individuals to 
maintain dignity and gain composure limits the Court’s ability to exclude 
evidence. Accordingly, some individuals find that what lies at the heart 
of the requirement is individual dignity, or “the ability to prepare your 
property and your mind for governmental intrusion of the most invasive 
sort.”94 The opportunity to gather oneself before intrusion “arises [only] 
when officers announce their presence and wait for the occupant of the 
home to grant them entry.”95 Perhaps a problem with the rule is that the 
public perception of the need to “knock-and-announce” is hampered by 
the public’s desire to expedite the criminal process, meaning that the 
public as a whole would rather see individual rights trampled so long as 
it is not their own individually, and so long as the criminal is 
apprehended. 
 
 
 
 88. Id. (quoting Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398) (internal quotes omitted). 
 89. Reilly, supra note 78, at 670. 
 90. Id. 
 91. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 92. Reilly, supra note 69, at 670 (quoting Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655) (internal quotes omitted). 
 93. Id. 
 94. E. Martin Estrada, A Toothless Tiger in the Constitutional Jungle: The “Knock-and-
Announce Rule” and the Sacred Castle Door, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 79 (2005). 
 95. Id. 
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B.  Traditional Remedies Under the “Knock-and-Announce” Rule are 
Inadequate 
 
Although the “knock-and-announce” requirement mandates the 
announcement prior to entry so as to provide protection for individuals, 
when the requirement is not met, individuals are too often left without 
recourse. Under a violation, any remedy the court imposes fails to 
compensate for the privacy intrusion. “Although the ‘knock-and-
announce’ rule provides important theoretical safeguards to the occupant 
of a home, in practical terms, it is a largely unenforceable constitutional 
right.”96 This has never been more evident than in Hudson. The majority 
opinion assumes that rather than excluding evidence taken under an 
illegal search or seizure, other remedies, including damages, provide 
protection for the wronged individual. Martin Estrada notes that “[i]n the 
criminal context, it is doubtful that evidence can be suppressed for a pure 
‘knock and announce’ rule violation.”97 This statement acquires meaning 
when coupled with the vast public perception and sentiment of 
apprehending criminals at whatever cost, regardless of the individual 
damages and wrongs inflicted upon them. Among such wrongs is the 
taking of evidence obtained through an improper search of a dwelling 
place. If courts no longer exclude evidence because of the Hudson 
holding, then the only remedies left are civil. However, “[a]s for a civil 
action, various legal hurdles and limitations make lodging a sustainable 
claim for breach of the ‘knock and announce’ rule an arduous 
proposition.”98
 
C.  Reasonable Suspicion: Flourishing Judicial Remedy Or Withered 
Exception? 
 
With the announcement under Hudson that not all evidence obtained 
through an illegal search must be excluded, the general requirement that 
police officers “knock-and-announce” before entering takes a large if not 
overwhelming hit. Such a hit occurs because without the “bite” that 
evidence exclusion provides, law enforcement officers have little 
incentive to conform to the “knock-and-announce” requirement. Both the 
wronged individuals and the law enforcement officers involved have 
countervailing interests that the judicial and legislative branches have 
provided for. Law enforcement officers want the protection and safety of 
not being thrust into harm’s way by being required to follow the “knock-
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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and-announce” rule, whereas individuals want a guarantee against 
intrusion from government officials without proper notification. The 
Hudson interpretation of the “knock and announce” rule caters to law 
enforcement’s needs while neglecting the needs of the individual. If the 
purpose of the rule is to protect individuals, not law enforcement 
officers, then the “knock-and-announce” requirement provides for an 
appropriate remedy for wronged individuals. 
Law enforcement officers already have protections that provide them 
with greater safety and freedom to act. Officers in most state jurisdictions 
have the ability to seek a no-knock warrant, to protect them from the 
compromising situation of knocking and allowing the individuals inside 
to muster either weapons or other articles that can prove dangerous to the 
officers.99 In addition to this legislative remedy, the judiciary has given a 
window of error to officers, under the doctrine of “reasonable suspicion” 
which allows them to bypass knocking and announcing when 
circumstances dictate it is either futile or will cause undue harm or 
danger.100 Because of Hudson’s holding that not all evidence discovered 
through a “knock-and-announce” violation needs to be excluded, 
safeguards such as “reasonable suspicion” have the potential of 
becoming dormant. By admitting evidence when the “knock-and-
announce” rule is violated, both the legislative and judicial remedies 
provided for safeguarding law enforcement are crippled. 
With the decision in Hudson, the status quo guiding the “reasonable 
suspicion” exception has evolved. Prior to the decision in Hudson, law 
enforcement officers were required to knock and announce unless there 
was a threat of physical violence, fear of evidence destruction, or if 
complying with the “knock-and-announce” requirement would be 
futile.101 These exceptions formed the “reasonable suspicion” governing 
law enforcement officers “knock-and-announce” violations. However, to 
the extent that Hudson has taken evidence exclusion off the table of 
remedies available to wronged individuals, the further function of the 
“reasonable suspicion” exception is uncertain. Whether or not the 
“reasonable suspicion” exception has withered into dormancy will 
depend on whether courts can redefine the scope of its applicability. 
However, without further judicial pronouncement on the exception’s 
applicability to “knock-and-announce” violations, the use of “reasonable 
suspicion” grants law enforcement officers full-scale protection against 
claims of unlawful entry. Hudson grants law enforcement officers 
protection against evidence exclusion, and when the “reasonable 
 99. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2179 (2006). 
 100. Id. at 2182. 
 101. Id. at 2162-63. 
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suspicion” exception is used it protects law enforcement from any further 
liability from the unlawful entry. While an individual’s right to recover 
from an unlawful entry is already slight, when law enforcement 
buttresses the “reasonable suspicion” exception with the ability to admit 
evidence obtained unlawfully, the result effectively seals off incentives 
to comply with the “knock-and-announce” rule because law enforcement 
officers can avoid liability under civil remedies as well as the threat of 
evidence exclusion. Such a situation can lead to a severe handicap on 
individual rights. Thus two possible long-term alternatives to the 
“reasonable suspicion” exception include either redefining its scope and 
applicability to consider the broad protections granted to law 
enforcement in Hudson, or withering its usefulness into dormancy. 
Additionally, the redefinition of the “reasonable suspicion” exception 
should take into consideration factors such as whether the jurisdiction 
offers “no knock” warrants, which further empowers a law enforcement 
to side-step the “knock-and-announce” requirement. What is certain 
regarding the “reasonable suspicion” exception is that the status quo has 
changed, leaving an even stronger protection for law enforcement 
officers. 
Individuals, unlike law enforcement officers, do not have similar 
protections. Prior to Hudson, the remedy available to individuals in most 
cases was evidence exclusion, regardless of when law enforcement 
seized the evidence.102 The doctrine of inevitable discovery further 
defined this exclusion.103 However, the holding in Hudson limits 
individuals’ rights upon improper searches and seizures. 
Because of Hudson, officers can either completely disregard “knock-
and-announce” rules, knowing that there is no fear of evidence 
suppression, or they can lump the action of entering without first 
announcing into the reasonable suspicion classification, as a protection 
against liability in situations where individuals attempt to enforce their 
rights through civil remedies. What results is a two-pronged situation: 
either ignoring the knock-and-announce rule and its reasonableness 
inquiry because the incentive to comply has evaporated with the 
majority’s holding, or lumping the unlawful entry into the breadth of the 
reasonable suspicion exception. 
 
 
 
 
 102. Id. at 2173 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)). 
 103. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
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D.  Use and Understanding of “Inevitable Discovery” 
 
The majority in Hudson used the doctrine of inevitable discovery in 
the reasoning it relied upon to reach its holding that a violation of the 
“knock-and-announce” rule does not warrant evidence suppression.104 
This doctrine was expressed by Justice Kennedy, writing a concurring 
opinion, when he stated that “[t]oday’s decision determines only that in 
the specific context of the knock-and-announce requirement, a violation 
is not sufficiently related to the later discovery of evidence to justify 
suppression.”105 The doctrine of inevitable discovery creeps in when 
discussing the causal relationship between the evidence discovered and 
the inappropriate search and seizure. Justice Kennedy further stated that 
“[civil] remedies apply to all violations, including, of course, exceptional 
cases in which unannounced entries cause severe fright and 
humiliation.”106 However, Justice Kennedy further stated that 
“[s]uppression is another matter. Under our precedents the causal link 
between a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement and a later 
search is too attenuated to allow suppression.”107 Leading up to the 
inevitable discovery doctrine, Justice Kennedy cites to United States v. 
Ramirez108that states, “application of the exclusionary rule depends on 
the existence of a ‘sufficient causal relationship’ between the unlawful 
conduct and the discovery of evidence.”109 What troubled Justice 
Kennedy, the deciding justice, was the causal link necessary to have 
evidence exclusion. In fact, Justice Kennedy later states that “[i]n this 
case the relevant evidence was discovered not because of a failure to 
knock-and-announce, but because of a subsequent search pursuant to a 
lawful warrant.”110
The majority deals with the doctrine of inevitable discovery through 
discussing both ‘but-for’ causation and attenuation, to differing levels of 
success. However, the writ for certiorari addressed the issue of inevitable 
discovery. The writ states: 
 
The issue that Wilson left open has divided the federal circuits and state 
courts of last resort. The Seventh Circuit and the Michigan Supreme 
Court have held the inevitable discovery doctrine creates a per se 
 104. Id. at 2173. 
 105. Id. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 2170–71. 
 108. 523 U.S. 65 (1998). 
 109. Hudson, 126 S. Ct at 2171 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 72). 
 110. Id. 
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exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence found after a “knock-
and-announce” violation because the police presumably would have 
found the same evidence if they had knocked and announced.111
 
The issue with the inevitable discovery doctrine is that “[b]y 
contrast, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits and the courts of last resort in 
Arkansas and Maryland have squarely rejected claims that the inevitable 
discovery doctrine should insulate ‘knock-and-announce’ violations from 
the exclusionary rule.”112 The misunderstanding of the inevitable 
discovery doctrine announced in Nix v. Williams113 “would eviscerate not 
only the ‘knock-and-announce’ but many other Fourth Amendment 
doctrines as well.”114 Other approaches to the inevitable discovery rule 
include that found in United States v. Langford115 a Seventh Circuit 
decision that stated that “[t]he fruits of an unlawful search are not 
excludible if it is clear that the police would have discovered those fruits 
had they obeyed the law.”116
In United State v. Dice117 the Sixth Circuit gives a different 
definition. There the court stated that “the inevitable discovery doctrine 
properly applies only when the evidence would have inevitably been 
found by means of an independent and untainted investigation.”118 The 
inevitable discovery doctrine thus, “does not apply when the very same 
officers who have violated the Fourth Amendment ‘knock-and-
announce’ requirement simply barge into a home and discover the 
evidence.”119
As stated by the Petitioners in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the 
concern over the differing definitions of the inevitable discovery doctrine 
is that “[t]he version of inevitable discovery followed by the Seventh 
Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court would destroy any incentive the 
police may have to comply with the ‘knock and announce’ 
requirement.”120 In fact, the argument went so far as to state: 
 
 
 111. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hudson, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 04-1360), 2005 WL 856040, 
at *7 (quoting Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 937 (1995)) [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari] 
 112. Id. 
 113. 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
 114. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 111, at *8. 
 115. 314 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 116. Id. at 895. 
 117. 200 F.3d 978 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 118. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 111, at *8. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
  
433] KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE – AN OUTDATED RULE? 451 
 
To remove the exclusionary bar from this type of knock-and-announce 
violation whenever officers possess a valid warrant would in one swift 
move gut the constitution’s regulation of how officers execute such 
warrants. . . . [T]he knock-and-announce rule “would be meaningless 
since an officer could obviate illegal entry in every instance simply by 
looking to the information used to obtain the warrant. [O]fficers, in 
executing a valid search warrant, could break in doors of private homes 
without sanction.”121
 
The same argument could “potentially be used to deny suppression 
of evidence even when the police proceed without a warrant at all.”122 As 
stated in the writ, in these cases, “police would only have to show that 
they could have obtained a warrant and that they would have found the 
same evidence if they had bothered to do so.”123
Based on the holding in Hudson, the inevitable discovery doctrine 
allows law enforcement much greater power in both obtaining evidence 
and also in using that evidence against individuals in criminal 
proceedings. 
 
E.  Protective Mechanisms Provided by the Legislative and Judicial 
Branches 
 
The Supreme Court in Hudson stated that in the absence of evidence 
exclusion protection, other mechanisms are available to compensate 
individuals for improper searches and seizures. In Bivens v. Six Agents of 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,124 the Court stated that “the Fourth 
Amendment does not specifically ‘provide for its enforcement by an 
award of money damages for the consequences of its 
violation.’”125However, the Court continued that “a monetary award of 
damages is nonetheless appropriate in the absence of an “explicit 
congressional declaration that . . .  they may not recover damages.”126 It 
was under this backdrop that individuals have become entitled to 
personal redress for injuries in the event a Fourth Amendment 
violation.127
What is difficult in the application of this rule, however, is the actual 
 121. Id. at *9 (quoting United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1220 (8th Cir. 1993)). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.. 
 124. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 125. Reilly, supra note 78, at 672 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396). 
 126. Id. (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397). 
 127. Id. 
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ability to recover. While Congress in 1979128 codified the right of an 
individual to recover monetary damages from government officials who 
violated the individual’s constitutional rights, there remains a limit on the 
ability to recover. The Supreme Court “has limited the statutory right of 
individuals to recover money damages under the [F]ederal Civil Action 
for Deprivation of Rights Law.”129 As part of the law, a number of 
officials performing discretionary functions receive qualified 
immunity.130 Despite the Hudson majority’s assumption that damage 
remedies are adequate, what appears to be the result is that in many 
circumstances, damages are not available to the individual, or if they are, 
officers have an affirmative defense that provides them with qualified 
immunity thereby avoiding responsibility for the intrusion, improper 
search and seizure.131
In essence, Hudson takes years of precedent of authority that gave 
more expansive reach to the exclusionary rule, and severely bridles its 
use in criminal proceedings. The entire deterrent effect that the 
exclusionary rule seemed to have is crippled, if not entirely destroyed, by 
allowing evidence to be used in proceedings after “knock-and-announce” 
violations. While exigent circumstances are an issue when dealing with 
the “knock-and-announce rule,” the court seems to handle them through 
the reasonable suspicion exception available to law enforcement 
officers.132 The problem that again surfaces, however, is that without a 
deterrent effect, the “reasonable suspicion” exception either needs to be 
redefined in its scope and applicability to accommodate the possible 
change in its effect resulting from the Hudson holding. Alternatively, it 
can have no effect at all if the consequence of violating the “knock-and-
announce” rule evaporate. If the “knock-and-announce” rule has been 
stripped of its Fourth Amendment bite, then perhaps Hudson stands for 
more than not requiring evidence suppression; it also sidesteps the 
applicability and undermines the future of the “knock-and-announce” 
requirement. 
 
 
 128. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or of the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other property proceeding for 
redress.”). 
 129. Reilly, supra note 78, at 672. 
 130. Id. at 673. 
 131. Reilly, supra note 78, at 672-73. 
 132. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2166 (2006). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION: AFTERMATH OF HUDSON AND FUTURE OF KNOCK-
AND-ANNOUNCE 
 
The majority opinion in Hudson has weakened the efficacy of the 
“knock-and-announce” rule. Hudson was incorrectly decided because it 
weakens an individual’s ability to enforce their Fourth Amendment 
rights. This weakening has perpetuated several problems. First, 
violating133 the “knock-and-announce” rule does not demand the 
exclusion of evidence seized during the violation. However, evidence 
exclusion is the only effective remedy for such violations contrary to the 
majority’s assumption that other remedies are more effective in 
providing a deterrent, including damages against officers. Second, the 
limitation of the exclusionary rule weakens the deterrent effect of the 
“knock-and-announce” rule, especially in light of the reasonable 
suspicion exception. Officers now have the ability to expand the 
umbrella of protection afforded by the “reasonable suspicion” exception. 
Under the pre-Hudson doctrine, officers were not required to “knock-
and-announce” their presence if there was a reasonable suspicion of 
danger or harm resulting from conforming to the requirement. Taken to 
its logical conclusion, Hudson abolishes the deterrent effect of the 
exclusionary rule. Officers are granted wide latitude to determine 
whether danger or harm was present, thus sidestepping the “knock-and-
announce” requirement without any punishment. 
While the present state of the law does not require evidence 
exclusion in “knock-and-announce” cases, the dissenting opinion 
articulates the more realistic impact of the Hudson case. Justice Breyer, 
leading the dissent, stated that “[t]oday’s opinion holds that evidence 
seized from a home following a violation of [the knock-and-announce] 
requirement need not be suppressed.”134 Justice Breyer continued by 
stating that “[a]s a result [of today’s decision], the Court destroys the 
strongest legal incentive to comply with the Constitution’s knock-and-
announce requirement.”135 Additionally, “[i]t represents a significant 
departure from the Court’s precedents. And it weakens, perhaps 
destroy[ing], much of the practical value of the Constitution’s knock-
and-announce protection.”136 The “knock-and-announce” requirement 
was effective because of its deterrent effect on law enforcement officers 
 133. This statement does not include situations where law enforcement officers have been 
issued a “no-knock” warrant or where law enforcement officers have a reasonable suspicion of 
danger exemplified in situations where the search is for guns (as was the case in Hudson before the 
violation occurred). 
 134. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2171 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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from unreasonable searches and seizures. The requirement that officers 
knock before entering was posited and analyzed in Wilson v. Arkansas137 
where the court “trac[ed] the lineage of the [rule] back to the 13th 
century,” and where the court wrote that “[a]n examination of the 
common law of search and seizure leaves no doubt that the 
reasonableness of a search of a dwelling may depend in part on whether 
law enforcement officers announced their presence and authority prior to 
entering.”138
The dissent argued for evidence exclusion. Relying on past 
precedent, the dissent stated that “a court must ‘conside[r]’ whether 
officers complied with the knock-and-announce requirement ‘in 
assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure.’ The Fourth 
Amendment insists that an unreasonable search or seizure is, 
constitutionally speaking, an illegal search or seizure.”139 After Weeks 
and Mapp, “‘the use of evidence secured through an illegal search and 
seizure’ is ‘barred’ in criminal trials.”140
Next, the dissent declared that the “driving legal purpose underlying 
the exclusionary rule, namely, the deterrence of unlawful government 
behavior, argues strongly for suppression.”141 The result of the majority’s 
decision was predicted by the dissent when they stated that “[w]ithout 
[the exclusionary] rule . . . police know that they can ignore the 
Constitution’s requirements without risking suppression of evidence 
discovered after an unreasonable entry.”142 The dissent also said that 
“some government officers will find it easier, or believe it less risky, to 
proceed with what they consider a necessary search immediately and 
without the requisite constitutional . . . compliance.”143
Of more importance to the dissent is what is likely to occur in the 
future with Fourth Amendment questions. First, the “State or the Federal 
government may provide alternative remedies for knock-and-announce 
violations.”144 What is important though is that evidence exclusion is the 
default remedy for improper searches based on “knock-and-announce” 
violations. The dissent noted that the Court has declined to apply the 
exclusionary rule in only two situations. First, “where there is a specific 
reason to believe that application of the rule would ‘not result in 
 137. 514 U.S. 927 (1995). 
 138. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2172 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 139. Id. at 2173 (quoting Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934). 
 140. Id. (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949)). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 2174. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
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appreciable deterrence,’” and second, “where admissibility in 
proceedings other than criminal trials [is] at issue.”145 Neither exception 
applied in Hudson here, and the dissent was unwilling to craft a third 
exception that would undermine the usefulness of a “knock-and-
announce” requirement. 
Furthermore, the dissent points out the misapplication of the 
“inevitable discovery” rule the majority relies on:146
 
That rule does not refer to discovery that would have taken place if the 
police behavior in question had . . . been lawful. The doctrine does not 
treat as critical what hypothetically could have happened had the police 
acted lawfully in the first place. Rather, “independent” or “inevitable” 
discovery refers to discovery that did occur or that would have occurred 
(1) despite (not simply in the absence of) the unlawful behavior and (2) 
independently of that unlawful behavior. The government cannot . . . 
avoid suppression of evidence seized without a warrant (or pursuant to 
a defective warrant) simply by showing that it could have obtained a 
valid warrant had it sought one. Instead, it must show that the same 
evidence “inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.”147
 
The dissent was saying that “[t]he inevitable discovery exception 
rests upon the principle that the remedial purposes of the exclusionary 
rule are not served by suppressing evidence discovered through a ‘later, 
lawful seizure’ that is ‘genuinely independent of an earlier, tainted 
one.’”148 The inevitable discovery doctrine applied by the majority is 
inapplicable in this instance. There was no lawful second entry, and 
though the officers held a valid warrant, they failed to execute it 
properly.  In the course of this failed execution, they performed an 
unlawful search and seizure of the premises. Additionally, whether the 
officers may have discovered the evidence independent of the unlawful 
search is beside the point where the issued warrant was not a “no-knock” 
warrant, which many states issue to assure police that prior 
announcement is not necessary.149
Also, the dissent appears to more appropriately consider the policy 
behind the adoption of a “knock-and-announce” requirement. The 
majority “set[s] forth a policy-related variant of the causal connection” in 
stating that “the law should suppress evidence only insofar as a Fourth 
 145. Id. at 2175 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)). 
 146. Id. at 2178. 
 147. Id. (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)) (internal citations omitted). 
 148. Id. (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988)). 
 149. Id. at 2178. 
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Amendment violation causes the kind of harm that the particular Fourth 
Amendment rule seeks to protect against.”150 Under the majority opinion, 
the “constitutional purpose of the knock-and-announce rule [was] to 
prevent needless destruction of property . . . and to avoid unpleasant 
surprise,” and thus exclusion of evidence should be limited to these types 
of situations.151 The dissent however, points out that such an argument 
“does not fully describe the constitutional values, purposes, and 
objectives underlying the knock-and-announce requirement.”152 Rather, 
the dissent adopts the language in Boyd, stating that “‘it is not the 
breaking of [an individual’s] doors’ that is the ‘essence of the offense,’ 
but the ‘invasions on his part of the government . . . of the sanctity of a 
man’s home and the privacies of life.’”153Additionally, the dissent states 
that “failure to comply with the knock-and-announce rule renders the 
related search unlawful. And where a search is unlawful, the law insists 
upon suppression of the evidence consequently discovered, even if that 
evidence or its possession has little or nothing to do with the reasons 
underlying the unconstitutionality of a search.”154
Furthermore, the interest-based approach advanced by the majority 
departs from prior law.155 Hudson serves to protect law enforcement 
officers who are already protected sufficiently. The dissent states that 
“[t]o argue that police efforts to assure compliance with the rule may 
prove dangerous . . . is not to argue against evidence suppression. It is to 
argue against the validity of the rule itself.”156 The dissent points out that 
the proper answer in these situations is the granting of the “reasonable 
suspicion” exception, and “no-knock” search warrants.157 In the absence 
of either, the dissent points out, police “maintain the backup ‘authority to 
exercise independent judgment concerning the wisdom of a no-knock 
entry at the time the warrant is being executed.’”158 Indeed, the dissent 
points out that if the manner of entry is a matter of interest to the law 
enforcement officers, the appropriate approach is to get a “no-knock” 
warrant: “[i]f probable cause justified a search for guns, why would it not 
also have justified a no-knock warrant, thereby diminishing any danger 
to the officers?” The dissent argues that “[t]he very process of arguing 
the merits of the violation would help to clarify the contours of the 
 150. Id. at 2179. 
 151. Id. at 2179–80. 
 152. Id. at 2180. 
 153. Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
 154. Id. at 2181 (internal citations omitted). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 2182. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 396 n.7 (1997)). 
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knock-and-announce rule,” rather than clouding them up as the majority 
believes.159According to the dissent, the law in the future should be: 
 
That procedural fact, along with no-knock warrants, back up authority 
to enter without knocking regardless, and use of the “reasonable 
suspicion” standard for doing so should resolve the government’s 
problems with the knock-and-announce rule while reducing the 
“uncertain[ty]” that the majority discusses to levels beneath that found 
elsewhere in  Fourth Amendment law.160
 
The long-term implications of the Hudson decision remain to be 
seen, though over time courts will likely shift to the views posited by the 
dissenting opinion. Despite the uncertainty arising from the decision in 
Hudson, the “knock-and-announce” rule is still viable, although 
significantly impaired. The rule thus continues to shape the duties of law 
enforcement, adds contours to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
inquiry, and stands as a minor protection to citizens in the safety and 
sanctity of their homes. 
J. Spencer Clark∗
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, 2008, Brigham Young University; B.S. 2004, 
Brigham Young University. 
